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《财富》专访史蒂夫·乔布斯

今年2月,《财富》高级编辑贝齐·莫里斯 (Betsy Morris) 在夏威夷的柯纳镇 (Kona, Hawaii) 采访了乔布斯。当时他正在那里与家人一起度假。访谈内容涉及了苹果的成功之道、发展障碍以及没有史蒂夫·乔布斯的苹果将会何去何从。

On the birth of the iPhone
"We all had cellphones. We just hated them, they were so awful to use. The software was terrible. The hardware wasn't very good. We talked to our friends, and they all hated their cellphones too. Everybody seemed to hate their phones. And we saw that these things really could become much more powerful and interesting to license. It's a huge market. I mean a billion phones get shipped every year, and that's almost an order of magnitude greater than the number of music players. It's four times the number of PCs that ship every year.

"It was a great challenge. Let's make a great phone that we fall in love with. And we've got the technology. We've got the miniaturization from the iPod. We've got the sophisticated operating system from Mac. Nobody had ever thought about putting operating systems as sophisticated as OS X inside a phone, so that was a real question. We had a big debate inside the company whether we could do that or not. And that was one where I had to adjudicate it and just say, 'We're going to do it. Let's try.' The smartest software guys were saying they can do it, so let's give them a shot. And they did."

关于 iPhone 的起源 
我们都用过手机,体验总是极其恐怖。软件烂得一塌糊涂,硬件也不怎么样。我们和朋友聊过,他们也都非常痛恨自己的手机。(每个人都痛恨自己的手机。)(注:文中的()内的字是《财富》网络版的特有内容,在印刷版中被删去。)于是我们觉得,这些东西完全可以变得更加强大,(摆出来也会很有意思。)这是一个巨大的市场--我的意思是,每年有10亿部手机被卖掉,这单生意在数量上可比随身听庞大多了,这相当于每年个人电脑出货量的四倍。

这是个巨大的挑战--我们要做出一款可以让我们自己都一见钟情的手机。(我们手中有技术,我们手中有源于 iPod 的微型制造工艺,我们手中还有来自 Mac 电脑的精密操作系统。)从未有人想过往手机里放进一个如 OS X 般精密的操作系统,看来这确实是个问题。在公司内部,针对我们能否实现这一目标曾经有过大规模的争论。我不得不当机立断地做出决定:"我们可以做到的。让我们试试看吧。"那些最聪明的软件工程师说,他们可以做得到,而我们必须给他们这个机会。他们果然做到了。

On Apple's connection with the consumer
"We did iTunes because we all love music. We made what we thought was the best jukebox in iTunes. Then we all wanted to carry our whole music libraries around with us. The team worked really hard. And the reason that they worked so hard is because we all wanted one. You know? I mean, the first few hundred customers were us.

"It's not about pop culture, and it's not about fooling people, and it's not about convincing people that they want something they don't. We figure out what we want. And I think we're pretty good at having the right discipline to think through whether a lot of other people are going to want it, too. That's what we get paid to do.

"So you can't go out and ask people, you know, what the next big [thing.] There's a great quote by Henry Ford, right? He said, 'If I'd have asked my customers what they wanted, they would have told me "A faster horse." ' "

关于苹果和消费者之间的联系 
(我们之所以去做 iTunes ,是因为我们都热爱音乐。我们在 iTunes 身上做出了自认为最好的音乐播放器。然后我们又都希望随身携带全部的音乐资料库。产品团队展开了非常艰辛的工作。它们之所以这么卖命,就是因为我们都需要一个这样的产品。你知道吗?我的意思是,我们自己就是最早期的那几百个用户。)

这事儿和流行文化无关,和坑蒙拐骗无关,和说服人们接受一件他们压根儿不需要的东西也无关。我们只是在搞明白我们自己需要什么。而且我认为,我们已经建立了一套良好的思维体系,以确保其他许多人都会需要这么个东西。我们收了钱就是来做这事儿的。

(所以你没法走大街上去问别人,你说,下一件牛叉的事情会是什么?亨利·福特曾经有过一句经典语录,对吧?他说:"如果我当年去问顾客他们想要什么,他们肯定会告诉我'一匹更快的马'。")

On choosing strategy
"We do no market research. We don't hire consultants. The only consultants I've ever hired in my 10 years is one firm to analyze Gateway's retail strategy so I would not make some of the same mistakes they made [when launching Apple's retail stores]. But we never hire consultants, per se. We just want to make great products.

"When we created the iTunes Music Store, we did that because we thought it would be great to be able to buy music electronically, not because we had plans to redefine the music industry. I mean, it just seemed like writing on the wall, that eventually all music would be distributed electronically. That seemed obvious because why have the cost? The music industry has huge returns. Why have all this [overhead] when you can just send electrons around easily?"

关于战略选择 
我们从不做市场调研。我们不招顾问。(这10年来我唯一招过的顾问是家公司,我让他们帮忙分析 Gateway 的零售策略,好让我们不(在开设苹果零售店时)犯下与他们一样的错误。但我们从来不招顾问,从本质上说。)我们只是想做出伟大的产品。

我们之所以开发 iTunes 音乐商店,是因为我们觉得,能够以电子方式购买音乐会相当了不起,而不是因为我们计划去重新定义音乐产业。我的意思是,音乐发行逐步电子化的趋势简直已经白底黑字地写在那儿了。(这再明白不过了,我们凭什么要多花钱啊?音乐行业的油水够肥了。)如果你可以简单地通过电子进行传播,为什么还要多花那些冤枉钱呢?

On what drives Apple employees
"We don't get a chance to do that many things, and every one should be really excellent. Because this is our life. Life is brief, and then you die, you know? So this is what we've chosen to do with our life. We could be sitting in a monastery somewhere in Japan. We could be out sailing. Some of the [executive team] could be playing golf. They could be running other companies. And we've all chosen to do this with our lives. So it better be damn good. It better be worth it. And we think it is."

关于苹果员工的动力 
人这辈子没法做太多事情,所以每一件都要做到精彩绝伦。因为,这就是我们的宿命。人生苦短,你明白吗?所以这是我们为人生做出的选择。我们本可以在日本某地的某座寺庙里打坐,我们本可以扬帆远航,管理层本可以去打高尔夫,他们本可以去掌管其他公司,而我们全都选择了在这辈子来做这样的一件事情。所以这件事情最好能够他妈的做好一点。(它最好能够物有所值。我们觉得它的确还不赖。)

On why people want to work at Apple:
"The reason is, is because you can't do what you can do at Apple anywhere else. The engineering is long gone in most PC companies. In the consumer electronics companies, they don't understand the software parts of it. And so you really can't make the products that you can make at Apple anywhere else right now. Apple's the only company that has everything under one roof.

"There's no other company that could make a MacBook Air and the reason is that not only do we control the hardware, but we control the operating system. And it is the intimate interaction between the operating system and the hardware that allows us to do that. There is no intimate interaction between Windows and a Dell notebook.

"Our DNA is as a consumer company -- for that individual customer who's voting thumbs up or thumbs down. That's who we think about. And we think that our job is to take responsibility for the complete user experience. And if it's not up to par, it's our fault, plain and simply."

关于为什么人们选择在苹果工作 
因为你在其他任何地方都做不了你在苹果可以做的事情。在那些电脑公司里,工程学早就没影儿了。在消费类电子产品公司里,他们根本不了解软件层面的事情。所以你现在根本不可能在其他地方做出你能在苹果公司里做出来的产品。苹果是唯一一家将方方面面全盘掌控的公司。

没有其他公司能够造一台 MacBook Air 出来,因为我们不仅控制了硬件,我们还控制了操作系统。得益于操作系统和硬件之间的紧密互动,我们才可以实现目标。在 Windows 和戴尔笔记本之间就没有什么紧密互动可言。

(我们骨子里就是一家消费品公司,你的生死存亡掌握在消费者的手中。他们才是我们关注的对象。我们觉得自己的工作就是对整个用户体验负责。如果表现不及格,那就是我们的错。错就一个字。)

On whether Apple could live without him
"We've got really capable people at Apple. I made Tim [Cook] COO and gave him the Mac division and he's done brilliantly. I mean, some people say, 'Oh, God, if [Jobs] got run over by a bus, Apple would be in trouble.' And, you know, I think it wouldn't be a party, but there are really capable people at Apple. And the board would have some good choices about who to pick as CEO. My job is to make the whole executive team good enough to be successors, so that's what I try to do."

关于苹果能否没有他 
苹果公司人才辈出。我把蒂姆·库克 (Tim Cook) 提拔成了 COO 并将 Mac 部门交到了他手上,他确实成绩斐然。我的意思是,有人说:"哦,老天,如果(乔布斯)被公交车给碾死了,苹果就歇菜了。"不过,你知道嘛,虽然这不是什么值得高兴的事儿,但董事会肯定会为 CEO 这个位置列出一些不错的人选。我的任务就是将整个管理团队都培养成优秀的继任者,我确实在尝试这么做。

On his demanding reputation:
"My job is to not be easy on people. My job is to make them better. My job is to pull things together from different parts of the company and clear the ways and get the resources for the key projects. And to take these great people we have and to push them and make them even better, coming up with more aggressive visions of how it could be."

关于他苛刻的名声 
我的工作不是对人表现得和蔼可亲。(我的工作是让他们做得更好。我的工作是把公司里的各种资源聚拢到一起,清除路障,然后把资源投放到最关键的项目上。)我的工作就是把我们手下这些牛人们召集起来然后督促他们然后让他们做得好上加好。怎么做呢?那就只好采取更为极端的思路。

On Apple's focus
"Apple is a $30 billion company, yet we've got less than 30 major products. I don't know if that's ever been done before. Certainly the great consumer electronics companies of the past had thousands of products. We tend to focus much more. People think focus means saying yes to the thing you've got to focus on. But that's not what it means at all. It means saying no to the hundred other good ideas that there are. You have to pick carefully.

"I'm actually as proud of many of the things we haven't done as the things we have done. The clearest example was when we were pressured for years to do a PDA, and I realized one day that 90% of the people who use a PDA only take information out of it on the road. They don't put information into it. Pretty soon cellphones are going to do that, so the PDA market's going to get reduced to a fraction of its current size, and it won't really be sustainable. So we decided not to get into it. If we had gotten into it, we wouldn't have had the resources to do the iPod. We probably wouldn't have seen it coming."

关于苹果的专注 
(苹果是一家价值300亿美元的公司,但我们的主要产品却少于30种。我不知道这种事情过去有没有发生过。但毫无疑问,过去那些了不起的电气公司都拥有数以千计的产品。我们相比之下要专注得多了。)人们以为"专注"的意思就是对你必须关注的事情点头称是。这并不是"专注"的全部内涵。"专注"意味着必须对另外 100 个好点子说不。你必须谨小慎微地做出选择。

对于那些我们做了的事情和那些我们没有做的事情,我都同样引以为傲。这里有一个再贴切不过的例子:很多年以来,我们都迫切地需要做出一款 PDA 产品,而终于有天我意识到,90% 的 PDA 用户只是在路上把信息从里头调出来而已。他们不会把信息放进去。没过多久,手机就实现了这样的功能,于是 PDA 市场就萎缩到了今天的规模。所以我们决定不进入这个领域。如果我们选择了跟进,我们就没有资源去开发 iPod 了。(我们基本上会连它的影子都见不着。)

On his management style
"We've got 25,000 people at Apple. About 10,000 of them are in the stores. And my job is to work with sort of the top 100 people, that's what I do. That doesn't mean they're all vice presidents. Some of them are just key individual contributors. So when a good idea comes, you know, part of my job is to move it around, just see what different people think, get people talking about it, argue with people about it, get ideas moving among that group of 100 people, get different people together to explore different aspects of it quietly, and, you know - just explore things."

关于他的管理风格 
在苹果公司,我们有 25,000 人。差不多 10,000 人在专卖店里工作。而我的工作是和最顶端的大约 100 个人协作,这就是我的工作内容。这并不意味着他们都是副总裁之类的领导,他们中的一些人只是贡献卓著的关键个体。所以如果有好点子出现,我的一部分工作就是把它传播开来,问问各人的看法,让人们围绕着它展开讨论,就此争论不休,让想法在这个由 100 人组成的群体里充分循环,让不同的人从不同的层面对它展开无声的摸索,你知道的,就是深入摸索。

On the benefits of owning an operating system
"That allows us to innovate at a much faster rate than if we had to wait for Microsoft, like Dell and HP and everybody else does. Because Microsoft has their own timetable, for probably good reasons. I mean Vista took what -- seven or eight years? It's hard to get your new feature that you need for your new hardware if it has to wait eight years. So we can set our own priorities and look at things in a more holistic way from the point of view of the customer. It also means that we can take it and we can make a version of it to fit in the iPhone and the iPod. And, you know, we certainly couldn't do that if we didn't own it."

关于拥有操作系统的好处 
这使得我们能够以更快的速度进行创新,而不要像戴尔、惠普和其他所有公司那样看着微软干着急。因为微软有自己的时间安排,或许是出于好意。我说的是, Vista 好像让人等了有个--七八年的?如果你需要等上八年,那为新硬件添加新功能就无从谈起了。而我们则可以自行决定孰轻孰重,从消费者的角度出发以更有整体感的眼光看问题。这也意味着我们不但可以把系统玩弄于股掌,还可以为iPhone和iPod制作特别的版本。而且,你知道的,如果没有操作系统的话,我们什么都实现不了。

On his marathon Monday meetings
"When you hire really good people you have to give them a piece of the business and let them run with it. That doesn't mean I don't get to kibitz a lot. But the reason you're hiring them is because you're going to give them the reins. I want [them] making as good or better decisions than I would. So the way to do that is to have them know everything, not just in their part of the business, but in every part of the business.

"So what we do every Monday is we review the whole business. We look at what we sold the week before. We look at every single product under development, products we're having trouble with, products where the demand is larger than we can make. All the stuff in development, we review. And we do it every single week. I put out an agenda -- 80% is the same as it was the last week, and we just walk down it every single week.

"We don't have a lot of process at Apple, but that's one of the few things we do just to all stay on the same page."

关于他马拉松似的周一例会 
当你招到了真正的人才,你就必须让他们分担一部分生意,并且充分放权。当然这并不意味着我就不能发表意见了。可是你招他们进来就是为了把接力棒交到他们手里。我希望他们能够做到青出于蓝而胜于蓝。所以要实现这个目标,就必须让他们了解所有事情,而不是停留于自身的业务范围之内。所以我们每周一做的事情就是回顾整个公司的运营情况。我们着眼于之前一周的销售项目,我们着眼于每个正在开发的产品--以及我们那些麻烦缠身的产品,那些需求超出了我们能力范围的产品。所有正在开发中的产品,我们都会回顾。我们每周都做这件事情。在苹果公司,我们没有太多的繁文缛节,但这是为数不多必须雷打不动的惯例之一。

On dealing with roadblocks
"At Pixar when we were making Toy Story, there came a time when we were forced to admit that the story wasn't great. It just wasn't great. We stopped production for five months.... We paid them all to twiddle their thumbs while the team perfected the story into what became Toy Story. And if they hadn't had the courage to stop, there would have never been a Toy Story the way it is, and there probably would have never been a Pixar.

"We called that the 'story crisis,' and we never expected to have another one. But you know what? There's been one on every film. We don't stop production for five months. We've gotten a little smarter about it. But there always seems to come a moment where it's just not working, and it's so easy to fool yourself - to convince yourself that it is when you know in your heart that it isn't.

"Well, you know what? It's been that way with [almost] every major project at Apple, too.... Take the iPhone. We had a different enclosure design for this iPhone until way too close to the introduction to ever change it. And I came in one Monday morning, I said, 'I just don't love this. I can't convince myself to fall in love with this. And this is the most important product we've ever done.'

"And we pushed the reset button. We went through all of the zillions of models we'd made and ideas we'd had. And we ended up creating what you see here as the iPhone, which is dramatically better. It was hell because we had to go to the team and say, 'All this work you've [done] for the last year, we're going to have to throw it away and start over, and we're going to have to work twice as hard now because we don't have enough time.' And you know what everybody said? 'Sign us up.'

"That happens more than you think, because this is not just engineering and science. There is art, too. Sometimes when you're in the middle of one of these crises, you're not sure you're going to make it to the other end. But we've always made it, and so we have a certain degree of confidence, although sometimes you wonder. I think the key thing is that we're not all terrified at the same time. I mean, we do put our heart and soul into these things."

关于排除万难 
(当我们在皮克斯 (Pixar) 制作《玩具总动员》 (Toy Story) 的时候,曾经有一次,我们不得不承认剧本实在不行。它就是不过关。我们一度将工期暂停了5个月......我们让每个人都拿着工资放大假去了。好好琢磨了一番之后,他们做出了你所看到的《玩具总动员》。假如当时他们没有停下来的勇气,那也不会有最终的《玩具总动员》,甚至也不会有皮克斯的今天。"我们曾称之为 '危机总动员',而且指望着这种事情别再发生。但是你知道吗?每部电影身上都发生了同样的事情。当然我们不再停工5个月,我们找到了更聪明的解决办法。但是总会有那么些山穷水尽的时刻,但是要蒙骗自己其实并不难--说服自己:其实你心里清楚,事情并不是这样的。)

(好吧,那你知道吗?在苹果,几乎每个大项目都会遇到这种情况......)拿 iPhone 举例。我们曾经有过一个迥异的 iPhone 封装设计,那时候离面世已经为时不远,甚至没有时间再做改动了。在某个周一的早晨,我走进公司说:"我就是不喜欢这个东西。我无法说服我自己爱上这个玩意儿。而这是我们做过的最重要的产品。"

然后我们就按下了重启键。我们重新回顾了曾经做出来的无数款模型机以及曾经有过的想法。最终,我们做出来了今天你看到的 iPhone。相比之下,好得出人意料。那个过程简直是去地狱里走了一圈,因为你不得不当着整个团队的面说:"你们在过去一年里做出来的所有东西,我们都要全盘否定并且重头再来。而且我们必须加倍努力,因为我们已经没时间了。"而你知道每个人都说了什么吗?"算我一个。"

这种情况发生得比你想象的频繁得多,因为这不仅仅是工程学和科学。这也是艺术。有时候当你身处这种危机之中,你无法确定自己是否可以把整件事情推向终点。但我们总是能够到达彼岸。所以我们总是胸有成竹,虽然有时候你会心生疑虑。(我认为事情的关键在于,我们在这种时候不会被完全吓倒。我指的是,我们全身心地投入了这些事情之中。)

On the iPod tipping point
"It was difficult for a while because for various reasons the Mac had not been accepted by a lot of people, who went with Windows. And we were just working really hard, and our market share wasn't going up. It makes you wonder sometimes whether you're wrong. Maybe our stuff isn't better, although we thought it was. Or maybe people don't care, which is even more depressing.

"It turns out with the iPod we kind of got out from that operating-system glass ceiling and it was great because [it showed that] Apple innovation, Apple engineering, Apple design did matter. The iPod captured 70% market share. I cannot tell you how important that was after so many years of laboring and seeing a 4% to 5% market share on the Mac. To see something like that happen with the iPod was a great shot in the arm for everybody."

关于 iPod 的引爆点 
有段时间我们过得很艰难。Mac 因为各种各样的原因不为众人所接受,这些人选择了 Windows。即便我们全力以赴,市场份额却没有增长。有时候,这会让你怀疑自己是否满盘皆错。或许我们的东西不够好,即便我们相信它已经达标。或许人们对此根本就漠不关心,这会让人心情更糟。

iPod 的出现让我们突破了操作系统的玻璃天花板。事情的美妙之处在于,它证明了苹果式的创新、苹果式的工程学以及苹果式的设计都是至关重要的。iPod 占据了 70% 的市场份额。即便是在多年打拼并见证了 Mac 电脑 4% 至 5% 的市场份额之后,我仍然无法用语言形容 iPod 对于苹果来说有多么重要。它对于所有人来说,都是一剂药效惊人的强心针。

On what they did next:
"We made more. We worked harder. We said: 'This is great. Let's do more.' I mean, the Mac market share is going up every single quarter. We're growing four times faster than the industry. People are starting to pay a little more attention. We've helped it along. We put Intel processors in and we can run PC apps alongside Mac apps. We helped it along. But I think a lot of it is people have finally started to realize that they don't have to put up with Windows - that there is an alternative. I think nobody really thought about it that way before."

关于他们之后的作为 
我们干劲倍增,并且更加努力。我们曾经说过:"这事儿挺不错,让我们搞得更大点。"我的意思是,Mac 的市场份额在每个季度都有增长。我们的增长速度是整个行业的四倍。而且我们正保持着这个势头。我们把英特尔处理器放了进来,而且我们不仅可以跑 Mac 软件,还可以运行 PC 上的应用程序。我认为这件事情最重要的一点在于,人们终于意识到,他们没必要再忍 Windows 了--其实还有另一个选择。我认为在此之前,从来没人这样想过。

On launching the Apple store
"It was very simple. The Mac faithful will drive to a destination, right? They'll drive somewhere special just to do that. But people who own Windows - we want to convert them to Mac. They will not drive somewhere special. They don't think they want a Mac. They will not take the risk of a 20-minute drive in case they don't like it.

"But if we put our store in a mall or on a street that they're walking by, and we reduce that risk from a 20-minute drive to 20 footsteps, then they're more likely to go in because there's really no risk. So we decided to put our stores in high-traffic locations. And it works."

关于开设苹果专卖店 
很简单。苹果教的伟大光芒会让信徒们开着车子跋山涉水前往同一个幸福的终点站,对吧?他们会开车去一个特别的地方做爱做的事。但是对于 Windows 用户来说--我们就有必要普度众生,让他们皈依Mac门。他们不会开车去什么特别的地方,他们觉得自己不需要Mac电脑,他们甚至都不愿意花上20分钟来开车来瞅瞅,他们担心自己压根儿就不喜欢苹果。

但是如果我们把店面开在大商场里或者大街上,人们会经常走过路过,而我们就可以将20分钟的车程缩短为20步的距离。然后呢,他们进来参观的可能性就大大增加了,因为这样就不用付出什么成本了。所以我们决定将苹果专卖店开到车流密集的区域。它确实奏效了。

On catching tech's next wave
"Things happen fairly slowly, you know. They do. These waves of technology, you can see them way before they happen, and you just have to choose wisely which ones you're going to surf. If you choose unwisely, then you can waste a lot of energy, but if you choose wisely it actually unfolds fairly slowly. It takes years.

"One of our biggest insights [years ago] was that we didn't want to get into any business where we didn't own or control the primary technology because you'll get your head handed to you.

"We realized that almost all - maybe all - of future consumer electronics, the primary technology was going to be software. And we were pretty good at software. We could do the operating system software. We could write applications on the Mac or even PC, like iTunes. We could write the software in the device, like you might put in an iPod or an iPhone or something. And we could write the back-end software that runs on a cloud, like iTunes.

"So we could write all these different kinds of software and make it work seamlessly. And you ask yourself, What other companies can do that? It's a pretty short list. The reason that we were very excited about the phone, beyond that fact that we all hated our phones, was that we didn't see anyone else who could make that kind of contribution. None of the handset manufacturers really are strong in software."

关于赶上下一波技术热潮 
事情的发展速度其实十分缓慢,这你也知道的。确实如此。这些一波接一波的技术热潮,你早在它们发生之前就能够预见到了。你需要做的,只是精明地选择站上哪一波热潮的风口浪尖。如果你站错队,那么你就会浪费许多精力。但是如果你走对方向,它呈现魅力的速度也是相当之缓慢。这也许要耗费数年之久。

多年前,我们最具前瞻性的观点之一,就是不要涉足任何我们不具备核心技术的领域,这样你会被杀得片甲不留。

我们意识到,对于绝大多数--或许是全部--未来的消费类电子产品而言,软件都将是核心技术。而我们在软件领域实在是得心应手。我们会做操作系统;我们会做 iTunes 这样能够同时在 PC 和 Mac 上运行的程序;我们会做嵌于设备内部的程序,让你放进 iPod 和 iPhone 里面;我们还会做运行于悄无声息之中的后端软件,比如 iTunes。

我们可以编写各种各样的软件,让它们交织在一起并无缝地协同工作。现在你问问你自己,还有哪些其他公司可以做这件事情?肯定寥寥无几。(在发现了人们讨厌自己手机的事实之后,我们对自己的手机产品变得极端兴奋,原因在于,我们没发现还有谁有能力做出这样的壮举。没有任何一个掌上设备制造商在软件领域有实力可言。)

On finding talent:
"When I hire somebody really senior, competence is the ante. They have to be really smart. But the real issue for me is, Are they going to fall in love with Apple? Because if they fall in love with Apple, everything else will take care of itself. They'll want to do what's best for Apple, not what's best for them, what's best for Steve, or anybody else.

"Recruiting is hard. It's just finding the needles in the haystack. We do it ourselves and we spend a lot of time at it. I've participated in the hiring of maybe 5,000-plus people in my life. So I take it very seriously. You can't know enough in a one-hour interview. So, in the end, it's ultimately based on your gut. How do I feel about this person? What are they like when they're challenged? Why are they here? I ask everybody that: 'Why are you here?' The answers themselves are not what you're looking for. It's the meta-data."

关于寻找人才 
如果要招一个级别够高的员工,那么此人能否胜任就像是在赌博。他们必须智商够高。但对我来说,问题则在于:他们是否会爱上苹果?因为如果他们能够与苹果坠入爱河,那么其他所有事情就会迎刃而解。他们会以苹果的最大利益为工作的出发点,而不是出于个人利益、史蒂夫的利益或者其他某个人的利益。

招聘绝非易事,就像是大海捞针一般。我这辈子经手过的招聘人数大概在 5,000 以上。我对待此事的态度非常严肃。你无法在一个小时的面试里了解足够多的信息。所以在最后,你只能凭借直觉做出选择。我对这个人印象如何?他们在面对挑战时会如何反应?他们现在为什么会来到这里?我问所有人:"你为什么来这里?"答案本身并不是你想要的东西。这只是元数据。

On failing, so far, with Apple TV
"Here's how I look at it. Everybody's tried to make a great product for the living room. Microsoft's tried, we've tried -- everybody's tried. And everybody's failed. We failed, so far.
"So there's a whole bunch of people that have tried, and every single one of them's failed, including us. And that's why I call it a hobby. It's not a business yet, it's a hobby.

"We've come out with our second try -- 'Apple TV, Take 2' is what we call it internally. We realized that the first product we did was about helping you view the content of whatever you had in iTunes on your Mac or PC, and wirelessly sending it to your widescreen TV.

"Well, it turns out that's not what people really wanted to do. I mean, yeah, it's nice to see your photos up on the big screen. That's frosting on the cake, but it's not the cake. What everybody really wanted, it turned out, was movies.

"So we began the process of talking to Hollywood studios and were able to get all the major studios to license their movies for rental. And we only have about 600 movies so far ingested on iTunes, but we'll have thousands later this year. We lowered the price to $229. And we'll see how it does. Will this resonate and be something that you just can't live without and love? We'll see. I think it's got a shot."

关于失败,目前为止,关于 Apple TV 的失败 
说说我的看法。每个人都曾经尝试过为客厅开发一个了不起的产品。微软试过了,我们也试过了--每个人都试过了。(我们失败了,在目前看来。)

(所有人都试过了,所有人都以失败告终,包括我们。)而且这就是为什么我将其称作一项"爱好"。它还不可以称作一个生意,它只是一个爱好。

我们已经做出了第二次尝试--"Apple TV, Take 2"是我们在公司内部对它的称呼。我们意识到,我们做出来的第一款产品只是在帮助你从电脑上取得内容,并且通过无线网络发送到 Apple TV 上面。

嗯,事实证明这并不是人们想要的体验。我的意思是,没错,能在大屏幕上看到你的照片也不错--但那是蛋糕上面的霜糖,而不是蛋糕。事实证明,人们真正需要的,是电影。

所以我们开始和好莱坞片商进行对话,并且成功地取得了所有好莱坞大片商的租赁授权。现在 iTunes 里面只能找到大约 600 部电影,但是在今年晚些时候,我们就会拥有数以千计的选择。(我们把价格降到了299美元,准备看看效果如何。)至于这会不会引发你的共鸣,并且成为你愿意与之共度余生的钟情之物?等着瞧吧。我看行。

On managing through the economic downturn
"We've had one of these before, when the dot-com bubble burst. What I told our company was that we were just going to invest our way through the downturn, that we weren't going to lay off people, that we'd taken a tremendous amount of effort to get them into Apple in the first place -- the last thing we were going to do is lay them off. And we were going to keep funding. In fact we were going to up our R&D budget so that we would be ahead of our competitors when the downturn was over. And that's exactly what we did. And it worked. And that's exactly what we'll do this time."

关于经济衰退期的管理 
我们之前已经经历过了一次,就是在 dot-com 泡沫破灭的时候。我告诉公司的是,我们会在经济衰退期里继续坚持自己的投资思路。既然我们曾经花费了巨大的精力将他们招进苹果,我们就不会裁员。我们不到迫不得已,绝不会裁员。而且我们还将持续拨款。实际上,我们当时计划调高研发预算,这样在度过经济衰退期之后,我们才可以领先于竞争对手。我们确实这样做了,而且行之有效。这次,我们还会做出一模一样的事情。

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